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THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY
Cambone, Stephen A. A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning. Washington, D.C.: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 1998. 262pp. $23.95

Stephen Cambone is the director of research
at the Institute for National Strategic
Studies at the National Defense University.
A former senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies,
Cambone is obviously well qualified to
undertake work that focuses on a proposed reorganization of the National Security Council (NSC). Cambone
approaches his work with vigor and an
insider’s knowledge of the workings of
the U.S. government’s highest nationalsecurity entity. He also extensively uses
the knowledge and expertise of two colleagues, Patrick J. Garrity of the Los
Alamos National Laboratory and Alistair
J. K. Shepard of the University of
Aberdeen, Scotland. They have included
valuable appendices for students of national security affairs on the major interests and issues that surround national
security policy development, as well as a
historical synopsis of the various national
security councils used by past presidents
and how the institution has evolved.
Cambone has included a compendium of
important presidential directives.
Cambone’s principal argument is that it
is time—now that the end of the Cold
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War is nearly a decade in the past—to reevaluate the National Security Act of
1947 and the institutions created by that
watershed law. Moreover, Cambone asks
his readers to consider what, if any, institutional changes should be implemented
to ensure that the United States is properly prepared for national security policy
planning in the post–Cold War era. He
is attempting, by his own admission,
to conduct an organization-and-process approach to the question of revising
the 1947 National Security Act; he is
largely successful.
Cambone boils down the present-day
debate over national security policy making
to two essential features. He identifies
one side as the issues faction and the
other as the interests faction. “Issues” advocates emphasize such things as religion, ethnicity, and human rights. These
national security analysts focus on the
need for countries to conform to international laws and norms. They emphasize
the protection of the rights of individuals
against the power of the state. They rely
heavily on international agreement to
settle problems. The “interest” faction,
on the other hand, is less concerned with
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the legal authority of the international
community and more interested in the
construction of a system that manages risk
to the United States as a sovereign state.
However, Cambone argues that the real
problem is that neither “issues” nor “interests” elements within national-security policy-making circles can agree on
an overarching concept for, or definition of, the nation’s security. The author’s answer is to suggest a new model
for national security decision making
that eschews the Cold War mentality and
methodology for policy making and takes
into account the new paradigms of the
post–Cold War era.
Cambone reviews how past national security policy was developed. He then
proposes a reorganization of the NSC into
five directorates: crisis management, regional affairs, home defense affairs, finance and trade, and science and
technology. A “dual-hatted” cabinet secretary would head these directorates. In
this way, the president’s control over national security policy development would
be strengthened.
While his suggestions for improvement
are well thought out and well intentioned,
his proposals may prove nearly impossible to implement. First and foremost, such
a proposed reorganization would need
strong political support on Capitol Hill.
A new National Security Act would likely
entail a tremendous amount of debate, as
senators and congressmen attempt to influence the legislation. One need only recall the highly rancorous and largely
unhealthy debate over service roles and
missions following the passage of the
1947 law to understand what might occur
if a new national security law were passed
along the lines that Cambone suggests.
This is not to say that the United States
should not consider a new law; Cambone
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simply needs to be aware that national
security policy has never been, and most
likely never will be, entirely devoid of
politics.
Nonetheless, Cambone’s model for a new
NSC is a logical one. Efficient and elegant, if implemented it would maximize
the president’s power to influence the
creation and accomplishment of national
security policy—something that the NSC
and the national security advisor are supposed to facilitate. Further, it would
make maximum use of the entire executive branch of government and take the
pressure off an understaffed and
ill-equipped White House to oversee national security policy, development, and
implementation. Yet the suggestion of a
dual-hatted cabinet secretary as head of a
national security “directorate” could prove
disastrous. Cambone ignores Washington’s deeply entrenched organizational
bureaucracies and their tendency to “socialize” appointed cabinet officials into
their own particular cultures. It has long
been axiomatic in the nation’s capital
that the president’s worst political and
bureaucratic enemies can reside in his
own cabinet; in 1867 such a situation
nearly drove an unpopular president
(Andrew Johnson) from office. To make
matters worse, most cabinet officials have
rather short tenures in office. Thus the
Washington bureaucracy knows full well
that these political appointees will be
moving on sooner or later; it waits them
out. Finally, presidential cabinet officials
are usually chosen not for their expertise
but for political expediency. Therefore, it
is very likely that the person who would
serve as a “directorate” chair might be
thoroughly unqualified for such a position of responsibility. Although the
way that national security policy is
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developed today is certainly not optimal,
would Cambone’s system be better?
Despite his failure to consider the second
and third-order effects of enacting the
system he proposes, Cambone provides
the basis for a great academic discussion
over future national security policy and
how it is developed. It is a topic that needs
to be discussed, and as the author has
emphatically pointed out, the time is
now. This point is hard to refute. As the
world’s sole remaining superpower, and
as the debate and divergence over how
policy gets developed becomes stronger,
the United States must reflect on how to
improve its national security decision
making structure.
In sum, Cambone and his colleagues
have provided a good point of departure
for a debate on how the United States
should develop and implement future
national security policy. There are many
things to consider, and this book will get
us started.
CHARLES NEIMEYER

Naval War College

O’Hanlon, Michael. Technological Change and the
Future of Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 208pp. $42.95

Over the past several years, the U.S. military has officially embraced the idea
that rapidly evolving technologies soon
will lead to a profound change in the
conduct of warfare. The need to innovate in response to a prospective revolution in military affairs is the central
theme of Joint Vision 2010 and similar
force-planning documents. Some studies, such as the congressionally mandated National Defense Panel, have
concluded that only immediate and
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radical transformation to new systems,
new operational concepts, and new organizations will enable the U.S. military
to retain its battlefield dominance.
Michael O’Hanlon, however, is not convinced. In his view, most calls for transformation lack any systematic or rigorous
analysis of how emerging technologies
might specifically change the character of
combat in the coming decades. Thus the
goal of this book is to provide realistic
projections of technological possibilities
that offer a better idea of how the U.S.
military might best proceed in future research and acquisition.
O’Hanlon examines a wide range of
militarily relevant technologies, in two
broad categories: those primarily electronic (sensors, computers, and communications), and those primarily mechanical
(vehicles, ships, aircraft, and weapons).
From this survey he offers an evaluation
of where evolving technologies are likely
to provide new capabilities over the next
two decades, and where significant force
limitations are likely to remain.
In the realm of electronics, O’Hanlon
expects continued advances in computers
and communications but foresees no imminent breakthrough in sensors that will
significantly improve one’s ability to detect and track the adversary’s activity. He
specifically rejects the idea that the battlefield can be rendered “transparent.”
On the mechanical side, he sees no
near-term developments that will allow
maneuver and strike forces to become
sufficiently light, fast, fuel efficient, or
stealthy to allow profound improvements
in speed of movement or lethality. Thus
he concludes that proponents of transformation provide neither a compelling
case for a near-term revolution in warfare
nor any adequate idea of what the military should be transforming itself into.
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